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On June 14, 1946, Mr. Bernard Baruch in presenting the United States
Atomic Energy Proposals to the United Nations said: "We are here to
make a choice between the quick and the dead." He added: "We must
elect vVorld Peace or "'arId Destruction."1 Today, less than three years
later, it appears that mankind may have chosen death and destruction.
From the perspectives of all people who prefer a democratic world
order, with freedoms and with peaceful procedures as the primary instru-
ments of social change, the proposals of the United States were most gen-
erous. The testimony of the best qualified experts is, furthermore, that
these proposals would have brought the peoples of the world the greatest
security against violence, <l€gression, and war that is technically possible.2
Though accepted and even demanded by an overwhelming majority of
nations, these proposals were rejected by the small group of men who rule
Russia and its satellites, and who view the world process as a fight to the
death between two competing systems.
What the United States proposed has been briefly summarized as
follO\ys:
1. Establishment of an international authority to be in sole
control of all operations classed as dangerous, and to have power
to deal with new developments as they arise.
2. The authority to license, control and inspect all other
atomic energy adivities left under national control.
3. The power of veto not to apply either to the day-to-day
work of the authority or to the punishment of transgressors.
4. The control scheme to be put into effect in successive
stages, the United States gradually relinquishing, to the extent
required by each stage, national control of its atomic activities.3
This is the clearest offer for world government by consent that a great
power has ever made.4 Had this offer been accepted and made effective,
with all needed ancillary measures, such as control over the dangers of
*An address delivered at the University of Mississippi on April 6, 1949, as part
of the Centennial exercises of the University.
tWilliam K. Townsend Professor of Law, Yale University; alumnus and for-
merly instructor in Latin and Greek, the University of Mississippi.
IFIRST REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS ATOMIC ENERGY CO~IMISSION TO THE
SECURITY COUNCIL 81 (Dep't State 1946). .
2This testimony is spread through the volumes of the BULLETIN OF ATOMIC
SCIENTISTS.
3Quoted from Friedwald, The Atomic Deadlock Could Be Brokell, 4 BeLL. A. S.
363 (1948).
4Cf. Nathanson, Review, 41 ILL. L. REV. 290 (1946).
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bacteriological warfare, most of the other issues that today' confront the
world could have been resolved with relative ease. In the absence of such
a minimum world police force, what we have instead is literally anarchy-
a world governed not by authority and reason, but by continuing expecta-
tions of violence; a world marching steadily toward a new war with all
the horrors anticipated from the new instruments of destruction; a world
in which there is a growing famine of body and spirit and the prospect of
rigorous economic depression; a world in which we see our traditional
liberties, and a democratic sharing of power, becoming increasingly pre-
carious in the garrison states deemed necessary to security. An optimist
has come to be defined as a man who thinks the future is uncertain.
It is not because of the demands of the peoples of the world that we
have come to this impasse. As never before, the peoples of the world are
demanding security, in the sense of freedom frooo expectations of violence,
and that wide sharing of power, respect, and enlightenment which we call
democracy, and the freedom and opportunity to pursue higher standards of
living, health, well-being, comfort, and congenial personal relations-all
values that cannot be achieved without a peaceful world order. Condi-
tioned by increasing exposure to the same attitudes (through movies, radio,
and newspapers) by growing common skills (those of industrialization), by
common character structures around the world, and by the accelerating
disappearance of caste and class structures, there is a growing unification
of peoples' demands everywhere, and increasing identifications by peoples
with larger and larger groups, from locality to world community.5
Even the Russians cast their demands in terms of these same basic
values and make their demands in terms of a world community. \Vhere
they purport to differ is largely in terms of means, of allegedly temporary
compromises for greater ultimate fulfilment. Their basic expectations of
the future include an inevitable collapse of \Vestern civilization, because
of alleged internal contradictions, with perhaps a "dying throes" attack upon
Russia, and the replacement of \Vestern capitalist democracy by a dictator-
ship of the proletariat, necessary in theory only to guide mankind to true
democracy. It is not difficult, therefore, to see why the Russian elite
spurned the American-\Vestern offer of international control of atomic
energy, with its beginnings of world government. To accept would have
meant to end their hope of ruling the world by means of a tightly disci-
plined world-wide political party, and, by opening Russia up to a freer flow
of enlightenment, might have meant to end their internal power. To ac-
cept ;vould have required them to change all the perspectives with which
they view the world and all their expectations and hopes of the future.
5Lasswell, The Interrelatiolls of World Orgallizatioll alld Societ:.... 55 YALE L. J.
889 (1946).
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As frustrating as this deep-rooted intransigence of the contemporary
Russian leaders is, the fact must be faced that any hope for the establish-
ment of a world order under law, by peaceful means, depends ultimately
upon cooperation from the Russians. I do not claim to dispose of any
miracle-working method for securing this cooperation. Like you, I sus-
pect any man who purports to have such a method as either an ignoramus
or a charlatan or a dupe in the service of the enemies of democracy. The
most that we can do is to seek to clarify the conditions under which a
democratic world order under law can be established, to appraise trends in
these conditions, and to increase critical awareness of rational methods of
escape from the present anarchy.
Coming now to a more direct consideration of the role of law in world
politics, much that I have to say may appear painfully obvious. I take com-
fort in the observation of Mr. Justice Holmes that it is of the obvious that
we need most to remind ourselves. vVith respect to the subject of our
discussion, Professor Niemeyer of Princeton has recently remarked:
There is no reality that is more compelling than the tacit
p~emise conditioning all our actions. There is no force that is as
inescapable as the images which dominate the subconscious layers
of the mind, just because the issues seem so self-evident, so need-
less of discussion and consideration. And there is no obstacle that
more persistently obstructs any practical progress than basic con-
cepts which have been passed down to us, unrevised and unadjust-
ed from a different age, and which, though outlived, still mold,
unnoticeably, a living reality.G
It is, therefore, of the utmost importance that we understand quite
clearly just what we mean by law, and also what values we seek to imple-
ment and effect by law, what factors we assume to condition our action,
and what interrelat!ons between law and other means we regard as rational
design to secure our ends. In seeking this clarity I propose to break my
remarks down under the following headings:
I. Confused Notions about the Relations between Law and Other
Variables in the vVorid Power Process.
II. The Traditional, but Unrealistic and Inadequate, Conception of
International Law as Doctrine.
III. The Necessity for Relating Law to the 'World Power Process, If
Doctrine Is To Be Made Meaningful and \Ve Are To Obtain Con-
trol of All Significant Variables.
GNIEMEYER, LAW WITHOUT FORCE 19 (1941).
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IV. How Power Is Shaped and Distributed on the Global Level-Law
Defined as Formal Authority Conjoined with Effective Control.
V. The Present Anarchy of International Doctrine and Practice with
Respect to Major Democratic Values.
VI. The Conditions that Produced the Contemporary Anarchy and How
These Conditions Have Changed.
VII. The Conditions of Democratic World Order under Law.
VIII. Rational Alternatives in a Bi-Polar Power Structure.
You can see that I have not taken my assignment lightly. Consider-
ing these points seriatim, let us look first at our existing confusion of
thought.
I. CONFUSED NOTIONS ABOUT THE RELATIONS BETWEEN LAW AND
OTHER VARIABLES IN WORLD POWER PROCESS
Most of the many proposals for escape from our present impasse com-
mit the fallacy of over-emphasizing some one of the several variables that
play important roles in the world power process. Thus, there is a' school
of functionalists who insist that the quickest way to world government is
to promote specialized world organizations, agencies and measures for
every purpose other than power or security-such as, for the greater pro-
duction and sharing of wealth, for the spread of enlightenment, for the
protection of civil liberties and the promotion of respect for human beings
simply as human beings, for improvement in standards of health and well-
being, and so on.7 Their theory is that if all of these factors are gradually
accounted for, it will eventually be possible to establish effective control for
maintaining security. Conversely, there is a growing school of "world
federalists" who insist that until the power variable is brought under lim-
ited control, until there is a moderately effective worfd police force, it is
largely futile to clamor for more and stronger functional organizations.s
Nation states calculating every international move in terms of its effects
on fighting power cannot be expected to do anything consequential on a
world-wide scale about the greater production and sharing of wealth, en-
lightenment, respect, and so on. The world government promoters cen-
tered about President Hutchins at the University of Chicago go so far as
to insist that anything less than full-blown world government, with a degree
7Mitrany, The Fltl1letional Approach to World O;ganizatioll, 24 INT. AFF. 350
(1948) ; MITRANY, A WORKING PEACE SYSTEM (1946); Pelcovits, World Government
Now? 193 HARPERS' 396 (1946) ; Cf. CROWTHER, THE ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION OF
EUROPE 54 (1948).
SMEYER, PEACE OR ANARCHY (1947); REVEs, THE ANATOMY 01' PEACE (1945).
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of control over all functions, from this moment on is Utopian.9 Specialists
on character and personality, such as the psychiatrists, urge that all other
tinkering with world power processes will be without much avail until we
are able to devise methods for producing people who are less sadistic and
masochistic, people more capable of respecting fundamental human dig-
nity.lO A former Assistant Secretary of State, a specialist on communica-
tion, has recently referred to "a genuine understanding among the people of
the earth" as "still the indispensable condition of a lasting peace."11 Other
specialists tend similarly to emphasize the critical importance of their par-
ticular interest and skills. Later I will offer still further examples and
suggest a method of analysis which can build upon the valid emphasis in all
of these approaches. It may be anticipated that rational action requires
understanding of the interrelation of all variables and a workable con-
ception of law. I omit all but a fleeting reference to the groups who over-
emphasize the possibilities of violence. The horrors and difficulties of a
preventive war I assume to be such as to remove it from any serious con-
sideration as a rational alternative.
II. THE TRADITIONAL, BUT UNREALISTIC AND INADEQUATE, CONCEPTION
Olf INTERNATIONAL LAW AS DOCTRINE
Turning to our next point, it is well known that the traditional con-
ception of International Law has been in terms of doctrine. The two words
are commonly used to refer to a body 0'£ rules.alleged to have succeeded to
the authority of the Pope and Emperor in regulating the relations between
states. This basic conception has endured through several centuries and
through the greatest variety of justifications for particular systems and
rules-justifications in terms of natural law, of the consent of states, of
various combinations of these two, of more recent metaphysical, and largely
incomprehensible theories of monism, dualism, auto-limitation, and so on,12
Typical modern expressions are:
Professor Brierly:
The Law of Nations, or International Law, may be defined as
the body of rules and principles of action which are binding upon
civilized states in their relations with one another,13
9Katz, Who Are the Utopians, 2 COMMON CAUSE 285 (1949); HUTCHINS and
others, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF A WORLD CONSTITUTION (1948).
10GLOVER, WAR, SADISM, AND PACIFISM (1935); Chisholm and others, The
Psychiatry of Enduring Peace and Social Progress, 9 PSYCHIATRY 1 (1946). See
also WEST, .PSYCHOLOGY AND WORLD ORDER (1945) and CONSCIENCE AND SOCIETY
(1942) .
IlBenton, Education for Peace, an address before the Phi Beta Kappa Association
of Southern California, Feb. 20, 1948. See also READ, EDUCATION FOR PEACE (1949)
and ASCOLI, THE POWER of FREEDOM (1949).
12A Useful brief history appears in Humphrey, On the Foundations of Interna-
tional Law, 39 A. J. I. L. 231 (1945).
13BRIERLY, LAW OF NATIONS 1 (3d ed. 1942).
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Judge Moore:
By international law we mean the body of rules which regu-
late the intercourse of nations in war and peace.14
Ambassador Jessup:
... international law or the law of nations must be defined as
law applicable to states in their mutual relations and to individuals
in their relations with states.15
Note that Ambassador]essup adds that the rules may relate to indi-
viduals, but nevertheless continues the emphasis on doctrine. Similar
definitions in terms of doctrine could be offered from countless other au-
thorities, ancient and modern.
The important point is that from this conception of International Law
.as doctrine, most writers, even those with the best of intentions, draw
inhibiting and disastrous conclusions with respect to the role of law in the
world power process.
Let us look at a few recent examples. Thus,
Sir Hartley Shawcross:
For law follows order: It does not precede it.16
Professor Brierly: .
For law by its very nature is a conservative force. 17
Professor Brierly ridicules those who "seem to imagine" that law "is a
sort of sociological maid of all work" and insists that it is not the function
of International Law to regulate the intercourse of peoples across boun-
daries. It is confined to delimiting the authority of states. Professor
Brierly states:
There are two possible views about the relation of law to this
task of organizing for the preservation of peace. It is a question
of priority, of whether law is the instrument which we must use
for the organization of peace, or one of the benefits that the or-
ganization will bring in its train. Professor Kelsen has recently
put forward the former of these views in the most uncompromising
terms.
"To eliminate war," he [Kelsen] writes, "the worst of all so-
cial evils, from interstate relations by establishing compulsory
14Moore, Fifty Years of IlIterM/iollal Law, 50 HARV. L. REv. 395 (1937).
15]ESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATlONS Ii (1948).
16Shawcross, Internatiollal Law: A Statemellt of the British View of its Role, 33
A. B. A. ]. 31 (1947).
17BRIERLY, THE OUTLOOK FOR INTERNATrONAI. LAW 125 (1944).
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jurisdiction, the juridical approach to an organization of the world
must precede any other attempt at international reform. . . .
The elimination of war is our paramount problem. It is a prob-
lem of international policy, and the most important means of in-
ternational law."
It is believed that this view is profoundly mistaken. There is
no such phenomenon in human society as "the rule of law" in the
literal sense of that term; force rules always, and the question
on which the difference between good government and bad depends
is always whether force is behind the law or elsewhere. Our
common phrase "law and order" inverts the true order of priority,
both historically and logically. Law never creates order, the most
it can do is to help to sustain order when that has once been
firmly established, for it sometimes acquires a prestige of its own
which enables it to foster an atmosphere favourable to the con-
tinuance of orderly social relations when these are called upon to
stand a strain. But always there has to be order before law can
even begin to take root and grow. When the circumstances are
propitious, law is the sequel, but it is never the instrument, of the
establishment of order.1s
Even more drastic is Professor Borchard:
As force grows in importance, the law recedes.
The assumption of numerous theorists that the weakness of
international law is due to the lack of force behind it is responsible
for much of the sorry thinking of the present day. International
law is a primitive system, not because it lacks the support of force,
but because it deals with sovereign states who cannot be coerced by
other states without entailing war.
The theorists in their attempt to produce the new order by
coercion, are driving out of existence international law, the only
law that is able to survive among a congeries of states, none of
whom is entitled to pass judgment on the others, and none of
whom is able to enforce its judgment without inviting war.
The fact that states in the international constellation differ
fundamentally from individuals in a municipal community, and
that the method of and procedure for controlling them must of
necessity' be entirely different, has not been recognized by the
1SId. at 73.
259
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seekers of a new \vorld order, romantic chasers of the interna-
tional rainbow.19
It is conceptions like these that cause many people to minimize the
effects to be achieved by changes in the structures and processes of both
formal authority and effective control at the level of world organization-
such, for example, as changes in the veto provisions of the United Nations
Charter or in the forces at the disposal of the United Nations.
III. THE NECESSITY FOR RELATING LAW TO THE WORLD
POWER PROCESS
We come now to our third main point, the necessity for relating law
to the world power process. Perhaps the easiest way to document the
inadequacies of the traditional conception of international law as doctrine
is to outline the possibility of a different approach. This approach does
not underestimate the importance of doctrine in the world power process.
We must recognize that the symbols by which men organize and express
all their perspectives (demands, identifications, and expectations) do have
a powerful effect on their behavior; psychiatrists are more than flip when
they suggest that we all have our pulse-rates organized about a hierarchy
of labels of varying degrees of abstraction. The doctrines of international
law, in particular, are habitually used by both public officials and private
citizens who occupy the greatest variety of power positions, national and
international. They are invoked by our executives and diplomats. They
are applied by our courts and appealed to by our legislators. The fact that
all parties to the current Berlin and other disputes seek to found their
actions and arguments in legality is testimony to the influence of these
doctrines.
It is equally important, however, not to overestimate the role of doc-
trine. It is an obvious fact that the skilled and informed advocate, whether
he is trying to persuade himself or ~thers, seldom need be without a base in
legality. The doctrines of international law, like those of national law,
have in Mr. Justice Cardozo's apt phrase, the unfortunate habit of traveling
in pairs of opposites. How deep antinomy is rooted in international law
may be observed by contrasting "sovereignty" with "subjection to law,"
pacta sunt servanda (agreements must be observed) with rebus sic stanti-
bus (but not if conditions have changed), and the contemporary illegality
of war with the right of self-defense.
19Borchard, The Impracticability of "Enforcing" Peace, 55 YALE L. J. 966 (1946).
The quotations are not consecutive statements and are taken from various portions
of the article.
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There is an old story that a philosopher can be defined as a blind man
in a dark room chasing a black cat that isn't there. It is sometimes said
that the lawyer goes the philosopher one better: He smuggles the cat in
under his coat and then emerges to produce him in triumph.20
The approach to international law which I am suggesting is not,·
however, founded upon this simple fact of doctrinal ambiguity. It seeks
to take into account also some fundamental lessons from contemporary
semantics, personality study, and social analysis and to build upon our now
lengthy experience in techniques of democratic, public administration. It
assumes that all human response, official and otherwise, is a function of
many environmental and predispositional factors, and not merely of words.
Among predispositional factors are attitudes, class, skill, and personality
or character structure. The environmental factors that may influence a
decision-maker include not only the facts of a particular controversy, and
the technical legal standards and policy propositions invok~d by the parties,
but also the whole social or community context in which the decision-
maker and parties find themselves. Technical legal words are but one
among many variables that affect the response of the decision-maker. To
put the point another way, it is an emphasis both of common sense and
contemporary semantics that words can be given complete meaning only
when located in context. The relevant questions for any communication
are who, says what, to whom, under what conditions, how, and with what
effects ?21 This truism and these queries are no less applicable to the
doctrines of international law than to other statements. To understand
these doctrines we must locate them in the total community process of
which they ·are a part.
I should like no\v to refer to a chart.22 This chart is an effort to offer
a compre}1ensive presentation of the social process in a community of any
size, to outline the total process in which this doctrine commonly called
law plays its part. An observer can describe this social process in either
one of two kinds of terms, either in terms of value variables or in terms of
institutions. In terms of value variables, one may talk of people using
power, respect, enlightenment, wealth, or any of the other values, as bases
to effect a distribution of these same values among people. People use
these values as bases for pmver by employing certain practices, by applying
doctrines and techniques. Hence, further description in terms of institu-
tions is needed, both to indicate in detail just what is meant by such high
level words as power, respect, enlightenment and so on, and to describe
200ne of Dean Prosser's many creations.
21Elaboratioll appears in Lasswell and McDougal, Legal EducatiOll and Public
Policy: Professional Tra.i/lillg in the Public hlterest, 52 YALE L. J. 203 (1943).
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just how in fact such values are shaped and distributed in any given com-
munity.
Institutions can, as indicated, be broken down into doctrine and ap-
plication, myth and technique. The organizations of our society can be
categorized in terms of government, political parties, pressure groups, and
private associations specialized to the production of any of the values.
It is here that we come to law. To acquire the most realistic under-
standing of law-to obtain the control of all variables necessary to effective
action-we must, I submit, define law today in terms of both values and
institutions. In terms of values, law is an element of the power structures
and processes of a community, but any or all of the major values of a
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is a part of government, that structure of formal authority which includes
the officials who are supposed to make the power decisions of a community,
the doctrines by which they are supposed to make decisions, and 'the prac-
tices by which they are supposed to apply doctrines. It is common knowl-
edge, however, in most communities that the formal facade of authority
seldom represents the whole fact. Behind government or operating through
government, the real rulers of a community, the people who make the im-
portant decisions, may be located in anyone of the other types of institu-.
tion, and these rulers may be using anyone or all of the major values as
bases to sanction their decisions. Thus, in Russia real power is obviously
in the political party; in this country, in various communities, it is some-
times alleged to be in private business associations. An observer who
would obtain a realistic picture of the role of doctrine, including an under-
standing of all the variables that affect decision, must, accordingly, identify
the structures and procedures of both formal authority and effective con-
trol. Just what is the formal structure of government in this community,
who is supposed to make the important decisions, and by what doctrines
and practices? But formal authority without effective control is illusion.
Who, on deeper scrutiny, actually makes the' decisions, and what effects do
they get? Shifting from a descriptive to a preferential perspective, it must
be remembered, however, that effective control without formal authority
is naked power and anti-democratic. Though to be effective law must
include real power, to be democratic it must include formal authority, es-
tablished on power widely shared. The conception of law to which we, as
democrats who wish to be influential, should subscribe is, therefore, that
of formal authority conjoined with effective control, and both widely
shared.
It is clear, if the above analysis be sound, that any realistic description
of International Law must locate both doctrine and practice (how doctrine
is applied) in the total world power process in which they playa part in
the shaping and distribution of values. The point of present emphasis is
that when we think of the social process as people, with all their perspectives
(their identifications, demands, and expectations) using anyone or all of
the major values of their community, by a great variety of institutional
methods, as power bases to effect the shaping and distribution of all values,
the effective role of doctrine becomes considerably smaller than the tradi-
tional presentation of law, whether municipal or international, assumes.
From this perspective, doctrine comes to be regarded as composed not of
autonomous absolutes but rather of symbols whose functions is to serve the
total policies of their users.23
23More detail on the theoretical structure from which these remarks stem can
be found in LASSWELL, POWER AND PERSONALITY (1948). Note especially the Ap-
pendix.
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IV. How POWER Is SHAPED AND DISTRIBUTED ON THE GLOBAL LEVEL
It is our task now to apply the general analysis, outlined above, to
the world power process and to consider its implications for a useful con-
ception of International Law.
In this connection I should like to draw attention to another chart.24
To obtain a realistic picture of the world power process, we must identify
. and describe the participants in that process, the arenas of their influence,
the criteria by which they are admitted to participation, the bases of their
power, the practices by which they shape and distribute power, and the
effects that they get.
Looking comprehensively at the shaping and distribution of power on
a global level, we see as the most obvious facts that there is not merely one
type of participant in this process, the nation-state, as traditional theory
assumes, but at least six different groups o'f participants and that people
in each of these groups employ doctrines and practices differently, de-
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or controversies with which they are concerned, the bases of their power
and the techniques at their disposal, and their objectives. The nation-
state is of course still by far the most important participant, but there are
in addition international governmental organizations, transnational political
parties, transnational pressure groups, transnational private associations
(cartels), and individual human beings. The role of the nation-state in the
total process is more and more affected by the powers and practices of the
other five participants.
With respect to any particular participant it is necessary to ask and
answer the same basic questions: How does this participant get admitted
to the processes of formal and real power? What are the bases of its
power? By what practices does it participate? What effects does it get?
How compatible are these effects with the prpferences of the observer?
The relevant inquiries may perhaps be made more meaningful by a
brief preliminary characterization of the role of the nation-state. States
get admitted to the formal processes of world power by a ceremony known
as "recognition;" their admission to real power depends upon the bases of
their power. The bases of their power can be found in their control over
resources (territory, technology, etc.), their control over people, and their
control over institutions. In terms of the latter, they have achieved a
degree of internal organization and a certain independence of other power
groups. The practices by which states shape and distribute power range
from diplomacy, agreement, and peaceful procedures generally to the other
pole of coercion, violence, and war. The effects that states get by these
practices can be described in terms of the control they secure over people,
resources, and value processes (wealth, respect, enlightnment, etc.).
Comprehensive investigation would pursue these inquiries and findings
in utmost detail with respect to all participants in the world power process..
How, for example, do groups get admitted to international governmental
organizations? \\That are the criteria of admission? \iVhat is the organiza-
tion's hierarchy of officials? \iVhat access do they have to the formal au-
thority of nation-states? What are the organization's bases of power? By
what practices does it operate? What effects does it get? And so on. The
world power process, however, not only affects but is also affected by all
the other value processes. Hence, once the power process has been out-
lined and an appraisal made of its effects on other values, it becomes neces-
sary to make comparable study of the structures and processes of the other
values (wealth, respect, enlightenment, etc.) and to appraise their effects
on the power process.
In every context, realistic study must inquire into the especial role of
doctrine, of myth, and seek to ascertain its exact effects on the shaping and
distribution of values. It can safely be anticipated, however, as has been
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emphasized above, that the attitude toward technical doctrine which any
official or decision-maker takes wil1 be found to be largely a function of
where he is located in this power structure and of what he is trying to do-
that he will be moved by the forum, the arena, he is in, by, for example,
whether he is a judge on a national court or on an international court or is
an arbitrator in a specially constituted tribunal; that he will be moved by
who the parties before him are, what their objectives are, and what his
appraisal of their objectives is; that he wil1 be moved by, in other words,
al1 his predispositional factors, and by many environmental factors, as well
as by technical, legal doctrine.
The contrasting interpretations of the parties to the Berlin dispute are
only dramatic documentation of what must be true, under conditions of
world anarchy, in every case. The intention of the parties to a treaty may
become as much a will-of-the-wisp to subsequent officials as the intent of
legislators or founding fathers in statutory or constitutional construction.25
Words, as we have seen, must take their meaning from a total context of
people, time, conditions, and purposes. Try as they wil1 the living cannot
recreate the total context and the intentions of the past. Even if the inten-
tions of the past could be made reasonably certain, the living will disregard
interference with their own basic objectives. This difficulty is inherent in
any law-making by the past for the present or the future. The living can
be expected to preserve some continuity with the past, to exhibit some
deference for precedent, but they are likewise always bending their inheri-
tance of canonized doctrine and institutions to contemporary purposes. In
the absence of officials to make and enforce interpretations from the pers-
pectives, and in the interests, of the world community, the officials of na-
tion-states can be expected to bend institutions and doctrines to divergent
national purposes.
It may be observed, to take an il1ustration some distance from home,
that the attitudes of the Russians toward international doctrines can be
traced through a considerable variety of pragmatic tergiversations in recent
decades. In the twenties, for example, they were strong for rebus sic
stantibus, in order to escape their debt problems. Today they emphasize
pacta sunt servanda, apparently hoping for a relatively peaceful world in
which they can carryon their revolutions by infiltration.
Two more concrete examples may help to clarify the limitations of a
purely doctrinal approach and to underline a difference between rational
and irrational use of doctrine. Without overemphasizing their importance
25The difficulties that inhere in such construction are outlined in McDougal and
Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements: Interchange-
able Instruments of National Policy, 54 YALE L. J. 181 (1945).
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for the prevention of war, let us look at the Nuremberg trials. There has
been a great hullabaloo among lawyers that the Nuremberg trials were
illegal and vicious because, it is alleged, the charter for the trials created
law after the commission of the offense. I should like to join with ex-
Secretary of State Stimson and others in suggesting that this is a very
limited view of the legal process. Mr. Stimson says:
It rests on a misconception of the whole nature of the law of
nations. International law is not a body of authoritative order or
statutes; it is the gradual expression case by case, of the moral
judgments of the civilized world.26
Another writer, Professor Meltzer of Chicago, has aptly said:
To shield the Nazi leaders by applying a principle designed
to protect men who acted without knowledge of their culpability
would involve a monumental perversion of justice. The mechani-
cal application of a Latin phrase, however important the value it
enshrines, should not be permitted to victimize the moral sense
of the peoples of the world.
Where, as in the case of the Nazi aggression, there has been a
grave, deliberate, and flagrant violation of widely accepted stand-
ards; where such a violation necessarily involved death and misery
for millions, it is more important to condemn and punish such
conduct than to follow literally the principle of retroactivity.27
The point I would make is this: A decision-maker who seeks to make
a rational use of doctrine in the power process, will ask himself this ques-
tion: Will the judicial trial of the Nazi conspirators, or of the Japanese,
do more to promote security in the future than their summary execution
or their being allowed to go free? Will such trial do more than any prac-
tical alternative, to promote the values that we all have at stake? If so,
he will put such values above any kind of a logical exercise or derivation
from some mechanical manipulation of a doctrine that was invented to
protect private individuals in a national ,government from the arbitrary
power of that government. In other words, the critics of Nuremberg take
arbitrarily a doctrine from the national power structure, carry it over into
the international, and use it in a new context for completely different pur-
poses from those for which it was designed.
For a second and more technical example, there is a relatively recent
case from the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. It is known as the
26Stimson, The Nuremberg Trial: Landmark in Law, 25 FORI\IGN AFFAIRS 179,
180 (1947).
27Meltzer, N~lremberg Trials, 14 U. OF CHI. L. RI\v. 455, 458 (1947).
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B ernstein28 case. Bernstein was a German of Jewish faith who was locked
up by the Nazis, and while in jail forced to sign a cession of a steamship
line that he owned. One of these ships was then sold to a Belgian corpora-
tion which took, with knowledge of the coercion, and bought for a fraction
of the value of the ship. The ship was sunk at sea during the war and the
proceeds of insurance put on deposit in aNew York bank. When Bern-
stein got out of jail and got to this country, he became an American citizen
and sued to collect the proceeds of this insurance. Our Second Circuit
Court of Appeals said: it is too bad for Bernstein, but we can not look
behind the "act of state" of the Nazi Government. The majority opinion
which reached this decision referred to all the acts of our executives, and
to all the acts of our military government in Germany, in setting aside such
"acts of state" in Germany, and admitted that if those funds had been
caught within our jurisdiction in Germany an opposite decision would have
been reached. But it lamented, because of this traditional theory that we
cannot look behind acts of state, we are compelled to reach our harsh and
impolitic decision. If there had been an investigation of the real function
of this doctrine of "act of state," of the contexts in which it had been in-
voked and the purposes for which it had been used along with a considera-
tion of its relevance to the particular problem before the Court, the Court
could, as a dissent suggested, have concluded the doctrine was just a mis-
leading analogy or metaphor that had no real bearing on its case.29
The important emphasis here, however, is that doctrine alone, no mat-
ter how rationally applied, is not enough. Upon the world scene, as upon
the national, the formal authority of doctrine without effective control, of
doctrine that is not sustained by appropriate organization and the necessary
bases in real power, is mere illusion. The importance of clarified doctrine,
of technical doctrine that is precisely related by operational definitions to
basic values, need not be minimized. But it is an omnipresent lesson not
rationally to be ignored, that effective control cannot be had by doctrine
only. For the world community as for the nation-state, a workable con-
ception of law must add to formal authority the real power that can bring
community coercion to bear for community interest, and must open up for
investigation all the factors that in fact influence the application of doctrine.
It may be added, if this conception of law be accepted, that much more
doctrine becomes relevant than is traditionally included under the heading
of public international law. \\Then one considers the shaping and sharing
of power on a global scale, and the effects of the practices outlined, the field
28Bernstein v. Van Heyghell Freres Societe Anonyme, 163 F.2d 246 (C.C.A. 2d.
1947), cert. dell., 332 U.S. 772 (1947).
29The decision is thoroughly and soundly criticised in Comment, 57 YALE L. ].
108 (1947).
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includes also what is commonly known as private international law or con-
flict of laws. These are doctrines announced and applied by national states
to limit, in the interest of comity and certain world community objectives,
their actual physical control or coercion with respect to territory, people,
and value changes. Likewise, the studies traditionally known as "compara-
tive law" become pertinent. The doctrines and practices by which elites in
nation-states shape and distribute values not only affect the power of their
nation-state in the world arena but also have direct external effects on the
values of other peoples around the globe. Just as the formal authority and
real power, the doctrine and practices, of the nation-state cannot be realis-
ticaIly studied apart from the world power process, so also the power
process of the world community cannot be realisticaIly studied without
consideration of the internal structures and processes of its more important
component parts. By exposing the degrees of equivalence and non-equiva-
lence, in terms of basic v~lues, in perspectives and practices in the various
regions of the world, such study may both intensify the solidarity of peoples
(where equivalences appear) and emphasize the necessities and opportuni-
ties for compromise (where non-equivalences appear).
It could be noted also, if this conception of law be accepted, that many
of the ancient mare's nests of public international law dissolve into semantic
quibbles. Thus, the repeated assertions by conservative professors that
international law is fundamentaIly incompatible with international organiza-
tion, that the whole notion of a real coercive power on the transnational
level is inconsistent with the notion of sovereignty, and that the idea of a
world police force rests on an. utterly untenable set of contradictory as-
sumptions, stand revealed as a complex of simple verbal confusions. Vv'hen
one thinks of sovereignty as merely the highest degree of formal authority
in any group, there is no incompatibility in saying that there can coexist a
certain degree of authority in nation-states with respect to the production
of wealth and the shaping and sharing of other values, and a stiIl higher
degree of authority in a world government with respect to security, the
control over violence. Similarly, the continued argument over whether
international law is "real" law or not, over whether it has any sanction,
becomes futile. It is obvious that all values and a great variety of institu-
tional practices can be and are being used as power bases in different
contexts to sanction international doctrines.. Sometimes decision-makers
have control of wealth, sometimes of real power in the form of force, again
of enlightenment and so on; a fruitful approach requires the delineation of
the exact role of both doctrine and practice, and of each value used as a
base for power. Finally, the often aIleged distinction between "legal"
questions and "political" questions becomes one not so much of rationality
as of arbitrary compromise in specific contexts. The whole function of
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legal doctrines is to shape and apply power; they are an integral and
indispensable part of that process, ordinarily called "political", by which
all values are shaped and distributed. Any other conception of "law" leaves
it a functionless "shape on paper or agitation in the air".30
V. THE PRESENT ANARCHY IN INTERNATIONAL DOCTRINE AND
PRACTICE WITH RESPECT To MAJOR DEMOCRATIC V ALVEs
We come now to the present anarchy in international doctrine and
practice with respect to major democratic values. Ideally a presentation of
this point would include a comprehensive survey of international doctrine
and practice with respect to each of our major values. Let's begin with
power and look again in brief synopsis at Chart II on the VVorld Power
Process. 31
With respect to the first and most important partlclpants, nation-
states, we observe that under present doctrine a~ld practice they are almost
completely free from external control, formal or real. In the absence of·
world community control of coercion, it is, and must be their consistent
policy based on "sovereignty" and "nationalism" to maintain this freedom.
Participation in and the admission of others to the formal processes of
peaceful diplomacy, commonly called "recognition," is still entirely a matter
of unilateral discretion. As a recent writer has said, the "simple truth is
that it is governed by no rules whatsoever. The fact is that each nation
reserves to itself the right to determine its own conditions and reasons for
according recognition to a new state."32 Palestine is a recent example.
Considering bases of power, we observe that territory is still subject
to the rule of capture, with complete state control over ownership. In
terms of people, there is likewise unfettered state control over emigration
and immigration. In terms of institutions, each state is left entirely free
to determine what form of government and other organizations it will have,
irrespective of consequences to the rest of the world.
With respect to the practices by which power is shaped, we find that
on the world level we are still in the law of the jungle: that agreements
are "valid" though obtained by duress, force, fraud, or coercion; that there
is no machinery for the enforcement of agreements on the international
level; that the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus permits states to get out of
agreements pretty much at will; and that there is no legal requirement
even that states continue diplomatic relations with each other, that they
30A phrase used in another connection by 1. A. Richards.
31The summary which follows draws on Dickinson, International Law: an Inven-
tory, 33 CALIF. L. REV. 506 (1945), a statement which is both more comprehensive
and more detailed.
32Brown, The Recognition of Israel, 42 A.I.LL. 620 (1948).
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can sever formal communications at will. In other words, the processes
for peaceful negotiation and agreement are almost without law. There are
a few doctrines about the diplomatic privileges and immunities of agents,
but these deal largely with an etiquette designed only to make peaceful
negotiations efficient.
Shifting to the other polar mode of shaping and sharing power,
violence and coercion, we find, though only very recently, that it is coming
to be assumed that aggressive war is illegal. There are the United Nations
Charter provisions, the Nuremberg precedent, the Kellog pact, and so
forth. Section 51 of the United Nations Charter, however, though imposing
certain new conditions of inaction and review by the Security Council, ex-
pressly reserves the traditional right to self-defense, and no state ever goes
to war except in what it regards or proclaims as self-defense. With re-
spect to the conduct of war, future military necessity is likely to know few
limits.33 The etiquette of conducting hostilities can be expected to change
even more drastically than in recent years to conform to the new impera-
tives of victory. To the newer technology may be added increase in the
number of combatants, the receding distinction between civilians and
combatants, total mobilization of resources, new developments in aerial
warfare, and the advent of totalitarian states. The whole purpose of the
new weapons being developed is quick and decisive destruction of an
enemy's will and ability to fight and no nation is likely to permit doctrinal
obstacles to stand in the way of that objective.34
Viewing the effects of "jurisdiction", and of factual power, it is ob-
vious that national states admit only very minor limitations on their control
over territory, people and value processes. 35 There are exc~ptions from
control for foreign ships, property of other governments, and occasionally
for aliens, plus some few concessions under traditional private international
law to encourage a precarious stability in private transactions. A presenta-
tion of these effects in broadest terms would require a resume of all the
ills of present world anarchy.
The picture is little different for values other than power. Let us
take security, considered as simple physical safety and freedom from ag-
gressive violence. The failure of all traditional procedures is commonplace
history. I have no desire to belittle the achievements of the United Nations,
but the limitations of the organization are obvious. Its fundamental weak-
ness could not be more clearly demonstrated than in its inability to settle
33Schwartzenberger, Patterns of International Law and Organization in the
Atomic Age, 59 ]URID. Rev. 95 (1947).
3·iSM1TH, THe CRISIS IN THE LAW OF NATIONS 67 (1947).
35It is here that the domains of traditional "public" and "private" international
law overlap with considerable confusion.
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the Berlin dispute. Consider what a difference it would make to the world
if there were a representative, centralized authority with power to hear
both sides and enforce a peaceful resolution of this controversy, securing
the reasonable interests of all parties.
Turning to the value wealth, despite all the great range of organizations,
the \Vorld Bank, the ITO, the Monetary Fund, and the specialized agencies
of the United Nations, there is really very little being done to increase the
efficiency of allocation, planning, and development practices. There is no
long-term, comprehensive, and adequate planning and development pro-
gram.36 Taken together, the powers of all the related organizations ~re
pitifully limited, and President Truman's Point "4" cannot be expected to
fill the gap without a substantial strengthening of world organization.
Appraising trends about respect for human dignity, it is obvious that
on the world level no protection is yet afforded the individual at all com-
parable to that secured by some of the best national constitutions. The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the proposed convention on
human rights, 'and the Genocide Convention are all heartening evidence of
a growing unity in the perspectives of the peoples of the world and deserve
the vigorous support of all democrats, but even assuming the genuine co-
operation of those who dispose of power in nation-states, implementation
will be difficult in a world of garrison states . 'When minimum security is
desperately at stake, civil liberties and respect for human dignity can be
expected to yield to paramount considerations of self-preservation.
The inevitability of similar conclusions for all other values-for en-
lightenment (freedoms of investigation and speech and press), for congen-
ial personal relationships (freedoms of marriage and fraternal association),
for standards of rectitude (freedoms of religion and scientific orientation),
and so on-preclude repetition. In summing up our contemporary anarchy,
I should like only to emphasize again the complete lack of any formal au-
thority on the world level that can pretend to effective control over violence
and the consequences that this entails for all other values. The world does
not have, as the nation-state has, centralized governmental machinery ade-
quate to bring the total coercion of the community to bear upon members
who threaten to disrupt its values. Even political parties, pressure groups,
and private associations have more eff~ctive control on the world level than
has government. It needs little emphasis that the world as yet has no
real legislature for declaring necessary policy,37 that it is mocking the word
36A more detailed description of both need and lack appear in McDOUGAL and
HABER, PROPERTY, WEALTH, LAND: PLANNING, ALLOCATION, AND DEvELOPMENT c. 12
(1948) .
37Cf. Dean, Illtenuztiollol Legislation, 33 A. B. A. J. 878 (1947).
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"executive" to suggest that the Security Council of the United Nations is an
effective instrument of executive functions, and that, as important as the
new International Court is, it is in no sense a court, like our Supreme
Court, coordinate with other branches of government and with power to
determine compatibility of practices by other branches, and subordinate
governmental units, with the basic principles of the United Nations.3s
The word anarchy alone suffices and it is accurate.
VI. THl~ CONDITIONS THAT PRODUCED THE CONTEMPORARY ANARCHY
AND How CONDITIONS HAVE CHANGED
It is familiar history how our contemporary doctrines and practices of
international law were made to measure for a world with only a fraction of
its present population, with a pre-industrial technology, and with its princi-
pal power units very differently organized, and organized for different
purposes, from the nation-states of today. Professor Bingham of Stanford
has recently made scathing reference to "mechanistic adherence to tradi-
tional ill-digested generalities and slogans devised by theoreticians of an
unscientific age of subsidized piracy, matchlocks, woodfires and candlelight,
wide-open spaces, and glorification of cruel aggressive forces for selfish
profit-theoreticians who could have foreseen little of the technology,
industries, social pressures, and dominant impulses of our crowded, com-
plex, modern civilization."39
From a state of relative independence, many fundamental changes-
changes in population, changes in the demands and aspirations of people,
changes in techniques of organization, and most important of all, changes in
technology, a technology which today for the first time makes possible
either the total destruction of the world or a centralized world government
with hitherto unimaginable creativity-have moved the peoples of the
world to a state of more and more inescapable interdependence. Speaking
about the confusion in our legal thought generally, I had occasion not long
ago to attempt a somewhat systematic summary:
This confusion in legal thinking and action was inherited from
a time-to draw the broader context-when Western European
civilization was successfully expanding its colonization over the
four corners of the globe, annihilating all who resisted or sub-
ordinating them as dependents to its imperial power.
38]essup, The Illtematiollal COllrt of Jllstice alld Legal 1.1atters, 42 ILL. L. REV.
273 (1947).
39Bingham, The COlltillelltal Shelf alld the Marginal Belt, 40 A. ]. I. L. 173
(1946) .
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It was a time when the way of life which we know as private
enterprise, with its minimum of community coercion, was free of
any deep concern for its own future.
vVhen men could pursue, secure, and preserve wealth, and use
private wealth as a base for affecting the distribution of other
values in the community, without too much regard for their effects
on the community or how the community was likely to respond.
vVhen men could pursue power and take for granted the sta-
bility of the framework within which they worked, without too
much concern for the continuation of the values which gave them
their power.
When men could pursue enlightenment after their own bent,
without regard for the consequences-when men could smash an
atom without expecting to smash mankind.
When every intellectual and artistic skill could be concerned
with itself and its own idiosyncrasies, with a minimal regard for
the community process which produced it and which it in turn
affected.
When men could demand respect for themselves, without too
much sensitiveness to the claims of others.
When differing conceptions of morality, of right, were de-
veloping with a minimum of effort at ~armonizing the differences.
It was a time, in still more general statement, of intellectual
and moral specialization and atomization, of the pluralization of
interests, when each interest made demands for itself with scant
consideration of the social context.
vVhen every person, as well as every group and nation, felt
relatively secure in pursuit of its own special interests, uncon-
cerned with the larger whole of society.
When people still felt-despite tremendous innovations and
changes in technology, in institutions, and in values-no impera-
tive need to assimilate and integrate the great transformations
they were experiencing.40
It needs no special emphasis to informed people, capable and willing
to face facts, that this is a time which has gone forever. So great, how-
ever, is the revolution demanded in all our thought and action, in all our
perspectives and procedures, it may not be amiss to recall the grim
warning issued last summer by the Emergency Committee of Atomic
Scientists:
40McDougal, The Law School of the Future: From Legal Realism to Policy
Science ill the World CO!ll1llullity, 56 YALE L. ]. 1345, 1347 (1947).
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. . we reiterate here our Six Point Statement published
originally on November 17, 1946:
1. Atomic bombs can now be made' cheaply and in large
number. They will become more destructive.
2. There is no military defense against atomic bombs and
none is to be expected.
3, Other nations can rediscover our secret processes by
themselves.
4. Preparedness against atomic war is futile, and if at-
tempted, will ruin the structure of our social order.
5. If war breaks out, atomic bombs will be used and they
will surely destroy our civilization.
6. There is no solution to this problem except international
control of atomic energy, and ultimately, the elimination of war.
Every scientific development in the intervening seventeen
months has supported the accuracy of this statement.41
Like the atomic scientists, we all sense today that a very profound
change has come over the world. With the peril to safety, so much greater
than at any previous time in mankind's history, there is of course peril to
all our other values. However nostalgic we may be, we all sense, further-
more, that we cannot achieve our own goals by attempting to act in
splendid isolation from the effects of the rest of the world on us and from
our effects on the rest of the world. It is recognized more and more that
there is a "dear planetary indivisibility"42 of all peoples everywhere, not
only as to the minimum value of physical safety, but as to all values-
the sharing of power, and the production and sharing of wealth, well-being,
enlightenment, health, and respect.
It is this fact of interdependence which is the most striking and urgent
fact of the contemporary world. It is a fact which can be documented both
territorially, with respect to each value around the globe and, functionally,
as between all values.
In terms of power and security the documentation of interdependence
is particularly obvious. Few will question, under threats of atomic and
biological warfare, that no people can be secure from violence and aggres-
sion unless all people everywhere are secure. The very bipolarity of the
existing power structure of the world is demonstration of a world com-
muni·ty in fact. The governments of the United States and Russia, and of
41A Statement by the Emergency C01llmittee of Atomic Scientists, April 12,
1948,4 BI;LL. A. S. 176 (1948). The signers are Albert Einstein, Chairman, Harold
C. Urey, Vice-Chairman, Harrison Brown, T. R. Hoglless, Joseph E. Mayer, Philip
M. Morse, H. J. Mul1er, Frederick Seitz.
42SCHERMAN, THE LAST BEST HOPE OF EARTH IS (1941).
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all the other nations, are so obsessed, necessarily obsessed, by expectation
of violence that they must calculate every proposed measure of cooperation
with respect to wealth, enlightenment, human rights, and so on, in terms
of its possible and probable effects on the balance of power, fighting effec-
tiveness, and, hence, on their security.
Conversely, just as the production and sharing of wealth are dependent
on security, security is dependent on wealth. Because of the demands of
people around the globe, no nation is likely to achieve security unless there
is a rising standard of living everywhere. Thus, paradoxically, a nation
which because of fears about power consequences refuses to assist in build-
ing up the rest of the world, may, because millions of people elsewhere
remain poor and envious and susceptible to invitations to violence, remain
insecure. The intimate interrelation of considerations of security and con-
siderations of wealth appears, further, in the Russian assumption indicated
above, that capitalism is in its death throes and that capitalist countries
may in a desperate effort to save themselves attack Russia.
The dependence of the production and sharing of goods and services
in anyone nation upon high standards of production and sharing in other
nations, and upon cooperation between nations, can be stated in terms of a
positive correlation. Economists have agreed for centuries that the greater
the resources that can be drawn upon and the greater the division and
specialization of labor, the greater the production of values. Nor is it
seriously questioned that this result holds irrespective of whether exchange
between areas is effected by individuals or by groups, governmental or
otherwise.
The inevitable effects of security considerations upon such values as
enlightenment and respect, and upon human rights generally, need no spe-
cial emphasis in a world haunted by garrison states, in fact and in spectre.
The dependence of all values upon enlightenment, and upon the method-
ically conscious use of foresight that is sometimes called planning, is equally
obvious. One might make further reference to the dependence of security
and wealth upon a wise use of respect, to the dependence of peace on
character, and to the dependence of character on enlightenment and child-
rearing. With respect to health, it is daily being proved that bacteria,
viruses, and pathogenic protozoa know no geographical boundaries.
J. B. S. Haldane has said, "Every Rumanian infected with infantile paraly-
sis, every Indian with small pox, every rat with plague, 'diminishes the
probable length of iny life."43
43Quoted in Hiscock, New Frontiers in Health Education, 37 CAN. J. PUB.
HEALTH 452 (1946).
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The conclusion to which a more systematic and detailed analysis of al1
these interdependences would point is clear: the dependence of man upon
man has become inescapably world-wide.
VII. THE CONDITIONS OF A DEMOCRATIC WORLD ORDl':R UNDl':R L~w
We come now to the critical issue. The formal answer, however, is
clear: the conditions of a democratic world order under law must include
both a distribution of values and a creation of institutions which will take
adequate account of the interdependences described above. In terms of
values the most important factor is, of course, power, and a democratic
world order under law will require both a very high degree of concentratJon
and a very wide dispersal of both formal and real power. A high degree
of concentration of power will be required to bring world-wide community
coercion to bear to maintain security, freedom from violence and aggression,
and to provide a framework of policy and regulation which will permit the
peoples of the world to pursue al1 their other values by peaceful procedures
and with the greatest efficiency that resources and technical skills al1ow.
A very wide dispersal of power, including a very wide sharing in control
over- the concentrated world security organization, will be required both to
insure that values are pursued by procedures compatible with democracy
and to secure the initiative and responsibility necessary to fullest produc-
tion.
It is remarkable to what degree all observers-from philosophers to
atomic scientists and political scientists, and even including bridge players
and lawyers-who consider our long-term objectives and what conditions
require today come to a single conclusion. Sometimes this conclusion is
phrased iri terms of the imperative necessity for a world "state;" at other
.times, in terms of such necessity for a "world police force." When details
of implementation are considered, the differences are largely semantic.
Typical recent statements fol1ow.
Professor Morgenthau:
Our analysis of the problem· of domestic peace. has shown
that the arguments of the advocates of the ~orld state is unan-
swerable: There can be no permanent international peace without
a state coextensive with the confines of the political world. The
question which calls now for our attention concerns the way in
which a world state can be createQ.44
Professor Rabinowitch:
In. the light of the present and impending developments in
military technology, there is only one realistic blueprint for se-
HMORGENTHAU, POLlTlCS AMONG THE NATlONS 398 (l948).
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curity for anyone nation: the subordination of all nations to
international law and order, and elimination of their right and ac-
tual ability to wage war. The establishment of such a community
of law-abiding (and not merely "peace-loving") nations is the
only intelligent long-range aim of foreign policy. This beacon
should guide our day-to-day political decisions; we should not
permit its light to be obscured by storms of national passions and
fogs of ideological confusion.45
An appropriate distribution of power is not, however, the only condi-
tion of a democratic order under law. Comprehensive specification would
include such other items as, in terms of values, a certain balance of income
and wealth, a lack of discrimination for reasons irrelevant to capacity under
respect, the flow of realistic information under enlightenment, less de-
structive personality formation under character, a growing standard of
common right under rectitude, and, in terms of institutions, the kind of
constitutional charter, modes of representation, allocation of functions,
structures of administration, and procedures required for the democratic
and effective performance of legislative, executivel and judicial functions.
As difficult as this comprehensive specification may prove, there is reason
to hope that, when the nation-states of the world come to a genuine wil-
lingness to cooperate on security problems, our long experience with
democratic constitutions and public administration in areas less than the
world and the contemporary developments in social and physical science
will bring the necessary technical recommendations within our competence.
Details will of course depend upon the context of the time and the com·
promises necessary to secure action.
It is with respect to short-run objectives and immediate steps, de-
signed to bring states to a more genuine willingness to cooperate on security·
problems, that debate rages most fiercely. In this connection I should like,
with deference, to refer to a statement made last spring by General Mar-
shall, as Secretary of State, and to suggest that it prescribes an approach
considerably sl101:t of what may prove most practicable. Opposing efforts of
proponents of a general revision of the United Nations charter, General
Marshall spoke as follows:
45Rabinowitch, The Narrow Way Out, 4 BULL. A.S. 185 (1948). Comparable
expressions abound in the literature. See, generally, Hearings before the House
Committee OIl Foreign Affairs, 80th Congo 2d Sess. (1948), Structure of the United
Nations and the Relations of the United States to the United Natiolls; SCHUMANN,
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (4th ed. 1948) ; \Vright, The Study of War, 2.\VORLD POLI-
TICS 243 (1949); BALDWIN, THE PRICE OF POWER 316 (1947); COUSINS, MODERN
MAN Is OBSOLETE (1945); Friedwald, The Atomic Deadlock Could be Broken, 4
BULL. A. S. 363 (1948); Usborne, The Crusade for World Government, 3 BULL.
A.S. 359 (1947).
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A number of projects designed to improve international con-
ditions by new forms of international organization have been
proposed. These projects envisage radical changes in the exist-
ing United Nations Charter.46 .
He then outlines some of the projects and conditions, and continues:
All of these projects appear to rest on the assumption that
the present unsatisfactory state of world affairs is a result of ina-
bility on the part of the United Nations to prevent aggression; that
this inability arises from the exercise of the veto power in the
Security Council and the lack of a United Nations police force;
that if the veto power on enforcement decisions could be removed
and the United Nations provided with armed forces, aggression
could be prevented; and that the principal barrier to world peace
would thereby cease to exist.
The general assumption rests I think on an incomplete an-
alysis of our main problems of foreign policy at this juncture and
of the part which international organization can play in solving
them.
The underlying problem in the immediate future is to bring
about the restoration of economic, social, and political health in the
world and to give to the peoples of the world a sense of security
which is essential for them to carryon the task of recovery. What
is needed for the achievement of a world order based on law and
dedicated to peace and progress is a widespread improvement in
the material and social well-being of the peoples of the world.
The General continues at some length in comparable terms.
No one would question that the improvements proposed by General
Marshall are needed for a democratic world order under law. But be-
cause of the expectations of violence which have been emphasized above,
because of the dependence ~ security of all these other values which
General Marshall rightly stresses, and because people will not, and cannot
be expected to, cooperate with respect to wealth and other values in any
real measure without calculating the effects of their cooperation on the
balance of power and security, I submit that we can expect no very real
achievement on the other values unless something is done, until effedive
action is taken, on the security problem. The negotiation of the Atlantic
Pact is recent recognition of the primacy of security and the real question
46Hearings, supra note 45, at 39; printed also in 18 DEp'T STAT" BULL. 463
(1948). The statement was made on May 5, 1948, to the House Foreign Affairs
Committee.
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is whether we should not continue to explore and propose security alter-
natives that admit of world-wide compass.
I might put the point another way : You will recall the writers who
insisted that order comes before law and not law before order. I should
like to suggest that the process is actually one of continuous interaction of
interdependent variables, that order affects law (power processes in which
formal authority is conjoined with effective control) and law affects order
(peaceful procedures in the pursuit of all values), that power affects
production and the sharing of wealth and that the production and sharing
of wealth affects power; and so on. Rational policy requires us to explore
and propose all hopeful alternatives, to catch hold of any handle, to obtain
control of any factor we can to affect this continuous process, and not to
assume that anyone alternative is the only answer or anyone factor the
only significant variable. In terms of priority of action, of immediate
tactics, there is good reason, however, to believe that nothing very conse-
quential can be done about other values except in a context of alternatives
which promise that the power-security problems \vill be resolved iIi con-
siderable measure.
It is necessary, finally, to dispose of a small group of dissenters who
appear to suggest that, even assuming a genuine willingness on the part of
the nation-states of the world, it is technically impossible to create effective
centralized control to ma~ntain security. This group minimizes the poten-
tialities of any effort to improve the United Nations, such as by changing
the veto provisions, and in general tends to scorn proposals for strength-
ening the structure of formal authority on the world level-thereby giving
comfort to isolationist, suicidal sentiments. Most members of this group
cite for support an article by Professor Jacob Viner, written early in 1946
before perhaps the full implications of the new technology were clearly
apparent. The most often quoted passage from Professor Viner reads:
The United States and Soviet Russia are each too strong,
relative to the total power potential of the world, to be proper
members of a world government, even "if their governments and
their peoples were genuinely willing to enter such a government.
In a narrow legal sense sovereignty can easily be formally sur-
rendered, but actual power is more difficult to surrender and can
be effectively surrendered only to an agency still more powerful.
In the present state of the world such an agency with superior
power not only does not exist but cannot be manufactured out of
existing ingredients, even if the genuine will to do so existed,
unless that will goes to the extent of preparedness on the part of
the United States and of Soviet Russia to dismember themselves.
Splitting the United States and splitting Soviet Russia seem to
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present a more difficult problem than splitting the atom proved to
be. Setting up a facade of world government where the power-
basis for its successful functioning was not present would be worse
than useless. No government would be fooled thereby into a
false sense of security, but every government would· be impelled
to pretend that it was, and all diplomacy would be carried out in
an atmosphere of superficially-concealed insincerityY
If what Professor Viner is saying (a construction which requires some
distortion of his words) is that, despite any apparent agreement, it will be
difficult to get the genuine agreement of the elites and peoples of the world,
to provide them with incentives in fact and to expand and intensify their
loyalties, for an effective security organization, one can only agree, still
insisting that we set promptly and resolutely to the task. If, on the other
hand, what he is saying is that given c(:msent it is technically impossible to
fashion a disarmament program for nation-states and to establish a world
police force capable of maintaining a reasonable security, the question be-
comes one for the appropriate technical experts and most of these appear
to disagree with Professor Viner. A typical summary of many expres-
sions can be taken from President A. H. Compton:
N ow for the first time also it becomes feasible for a central
authority to enforce peace throughout the world. Before the sec-
ond World War, many parts of the earth were difficult of access
by a world police. Today this is changed. Fast airplanes, long-
range rockets, and atomic bombs have now solved the technical
problem of bringing to bear on any area at any time, whatever
destructive force may be required to quell resistance. A central
authority having virtual monopoly of these major means of war-
fare can now be equipped to enforce international peace.48
VIII. RATIONAL ALTERNATIVES IN A BI-POLAR POWER STRUCTUR~
It needs no great prophetic insight, however, to anticipate that no
genuine willingness of nation-states to create an effective, world-wide se-
curity organization can be expected in the calculable future. We come
finally, therefore, to rational alternatives in a bi-polar world. For us as
Americans, rational alternatives seem to me to require a three-fold pro-
gram:
First, we can continue, as we are doing, to attempt to contain Russia
and the Communist Party by peaceful means.
47Viner, The Implicatiolls of the Atomic Bomb for bltemational Relations, 90
PROC. AM. PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY 56 (1946).
48Quoted in BLACKETT, FEAR, WAR, AND THE BOMB 91 (1948).
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Second, we can undertake the tighter and tighter organization of the
free part of the world not only by such limited purpose devices as the
Atlantic and comparable pacts, but also by preparing and proposing a model
for more comprehensive organization on a regional basis, always leaving
open the possibility for admission, at a more propitious future time, of new
regions from behind the iron curtain.
Third, we can continue to take the initiative in clarifying for ourselves
and others the kind of world community in which we as democrats would
like to live and the kind of world community organization, in utmost
detail, which can guarantee security and democratic values for all people.
The assumption and exercise of moral leadership in the name. of all peoples
can only add to our national strength, which may be indispensable to force
certain necessary compromises.
To return for a moment to the role of doctrine, it is important to
recognize that some of the traditional doctrines and practices of interna-
tional law may contribute to our purposes. For this reason the agitation
in the United Nations for the codification of international law can be en-
couraged, in the hope that it may result in a real clarification of policies. It
is important also to recognize that during a period of transition, while the
globe is broken up into Russian centered and American centered orbits,
much of our effective international doctrine and practice will be in fact
adjusted to the needs of those who share our objectives and are willing to
work with us toward their realization. Hence, while we have in mind the
globe as a whole, we may have to recognize that the principal function of
our clarified doctrines and practices will be to smooth relationships among
states in our part of the world community. The fact that doctrine which is
phrased in the name of all nations of the world does effectively apply to
some of them only is no novelty. The history of the development of inter-
national law and practice is not the history of a concerted effort among
equals throughout the globe. It is on the contrary a history of conceptions
which clarified the values for the most part of people who in modern times
have shared the values of Western European civilization. The problem of
this time is to reconsider the adequacy of traditional doctrines and prac-
tices for the task of bringing into effective working relationship all the
peoples with whom we can cooperate.
The task of building an effective democratic world community or-
ganization with appropriate doctrine and procedures, to include first the
Western-centered orbit and eventually the Russian, poses, it must be
admitted, problems of the greatest difficulty for professional specialists and
will require the firmest public support. It is this objective, however,-
the objective of an organization that can guarantee reasonable security and
free us for the peaceful pursuit of all other values-that we should hold
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constantly before us, whatever the temporary compromises that conditions
may require. As indispensable as a balancing of power policy is under
contemporary conditions, in the end, if it is not replaced by an effective
world police force, the high probability is-all history shows-that it will
lead to war.49 The demand upon us, the opportunity for us, is to exercise
for the new conditions of our time the same acumen and creativeness which
led, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, to formulation of the basic
principles and practices of the modern era. This demand has been most
eloquently phrased by Professor Einstein. In a recent statemel1t he says:
Our situation is not comparable to anything in the past. It is
impossible, therefore, to apply methods and measures which at an
earlier age might have been sufficient. We must revolutionize
our thinking, revolutionize our actions, and must have the courage
to revolutionize relations among the nations of the world. Cliches
of yesterday will no longer do today, and will, no doubt, be hope- .
lessly out of date tomorrow. To bring this home to men all over
the world is the most important and most fateful social function
intellectuals have ever had to shoulder.
A tremendous effort is indispensable. If it fails now, the
supra-national organization will be built later, but then it will have
to be built upon the ruins of a large part of the now existing
world. Let us hope that the abolition of the existing international
anarchy will not need to be bought by a self-inflicted world catas-
trophe the dimension of which none of us can possibly imagine.
The time is terribly short. We must act now if we are to
act at all.50
49Helen Mears, in MIRROR FOR AMERICANS: JAPAN 3]7 (1948), graphically
depicts the difficulties of a balancing of power policy: "Nothing could be more
clearly designed to highlight the failure of the system of balance-of-power politics
than the relations of Britain and the United States to both Japan and Russia during
Japan's modern period. Looking at the record, and stating it in its simplest, most
obvious terms, the British "security" system looks like nothing so much as a bowling
alley in which nations are set up like tenpins only to be knocked down again. First
Japan was set up to knock down Russia. Then Japan proved "unreliable" and we set
up Russia (Remember Yalta!) to help knock down Japan. Now it appears that
Russia is already even more "unreliable" than Japan, so we are trying to get China
set up, by establishing a strong centralized regime, under the "progressive" Chiang
Kai-Shek. to help knock Russia down again: Weare also, of course, attempting to
"stabilize" Korea for the same purpose. The Japanese islands are thought of as a base
for such proceedings. If this nonsense isn't stopped-and if war doesn't ·come in the
meantime-twenty years or so from now we'll be building up Japan or Russia again,
to knock down China."
504 BULL. A.S. 295, 299 (1948).
